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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a critical review of the empirical literature on the relationship between health
insurance, labor supply, and job mobility. We review over 50 papers on this topic, almost exclusively
written in the last 10 years. We reach five conclusions. First, there is clear and unambiguous evidence that
health insurance is a central determinant of retirement decisions. Second, there is fairly clear evidence that
health insurance is not a major determinant of the labor supply and welfare exit decisions of low income
mothers. Third, there is fairly compelling evidence that health insurance is an important factor in the labor
supply decisions of secondary earners. Fourth, while there is some division in the literature, the most
convincing evidence suggests that health insurance plays an important role in job mobility decisions.
Finally, there is virtually no evidence in the literature on the welfare implications of these results. We
present some rudimentary calculations which suggest that the welfare costs of job lock are likely to be
modest. Our general conclusion is that health insurance has important effects on both labor force
participation and job choice, but that it is not clear whether or not these effects results in large losses of
either welfare or efficiency.
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Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job Mobility:
A Critical Review of the Literature
I. Introduction
A distinctive feature of the health insurance market in the U.S. is that group insurance is
available almost exclusively through the workplace, with very few pooling mechanisms available
for insurance purchase outside of work.  As a result, over ninety percent of the privately insured
population currently obtains their insurance coverage through the workplace, either through their
own employment or the employment of a family member (Employee Benefit Research Institute,
2000).
This restriction of health insurance purchase to the workplace setting has potentially quite
important implications for the functioning of the U.S. labor market, along many dimensions.  For
example, the high level of health insurance costs, currently amounting to 6.7% of compensation
(McDonnell and Fronstin, 1999), has been shown to impact wage, employment and hours
determination in labor market equilibrium.
1  Another important set of potential impacts is on
labor supply and job mobility decisions.  Given the high and variable level of health care costs
for many workers, health insurance can be a key factor in the decision to work, to retire, to leave
welfare, or to switch jobs.
The potential for important impacts of health insurance on labor supply and job mobility
decisions has motivated a significant literature on this topic over the past decade.  While there
was virtually no work on these issues before 1990, in this article we review over 50 scholarly
articles written in the ten years since.  This literature is wide ranging in both substance and in
empirical approach.  Yet important commonalities exist which allow for a fairly comprehensive
and rigorous review of the findings, allowing us a fairly clear assessment of what the past decade
of work has taught us about health insurance, labor supply, and job mobility.
We have two primary conclusions from our critical literature review.  First, this literature
has gone far in one important direction, namely quantifying the importance of health insurance
for labor supply and job choice decisions.  As in all academic discourse, there is some3
disagreement, but our reading of the evidence is that there is a fairly consistent case to be made
that health insurance matters quite a bit for decisions such as whether to retire or to change jobs.
Our second conclusion, however, is that the literature has essentially failed to advance our
knowledge along another critical dimension–the implications of these results.  We know, for
example, that individuals with health insurance who particularly value that insurance are less
likely to leave those jobs than their counterparts who value it less.  But we don’t know whether
this substantially reduces either economic growth or personal welfare.  Given the importance of
labor mobility in the U.S. economy, it seems likely that the welfare costs of such labor market
distortions may be large.  But there have been essentially no attempts to quantify them.  Similar
limitations exist with the literature on health insurance and labor supply.
In this paper, we provide an integrating framework for thinking about these literatures. 
We begin by providing a general model of health insurance and mobility that documents why
“job lock,” or insurance induced immobility, may arise; this model is easily applied as well to
health insurance and labor supply decisions.  We then provide a critical review of the exciting
and large (almost exclusively empirical) literature that has arisen on these topics over the past
decade.  Finally, we conclude with a heuristic discussion of how one might think about the
welfare implications of these findings.  We do not in this paper provide direct evidence on
welfare implications or even a rigorous framework for computing welfare costs.  But we lay out
the issues that must, and should, be tackled by those who will take on this important task.
II. A Model of Employer-Provided Health Insurance and Labor Mobility
In this section, we discuss a simple model that illustrates the notion that “job lock” might
be an important concern.  While the model focuses on mobility, it is easily extended to consider
labor supply effects as well, as we discuss below.  This section draws heavily on the model
developed in Gruber (2000).
The very notion that health insurance is responsible for imperfections in the functioning
of the U.S. labor market is somewhat curious.  After all, health insurance is a voluntarily
provided form of employee compensation.  There is little discussion of the distortions to the
labor market from cash wages.  Why is health insurance different?
To see the difficulties introduced by health insurance in reality, it is useful to begin with a
very stylized "pure compensating differentials" model (Rosen, 1986).  We start with a highly
stylized example in which there is no distortionary effect of health insurance on the labor market. 
We then relax the very strong assumptions that are required by this example in order to illustrate
the source of distortions to mobility.
In this example, health insurance coverage consists of a binary, homogeneous good;
individuals are either covered or not, and if covered have the exact same insurance plans. 
Insurance is perfectly experience rated at the worker level.  That is, firms essentially purchase4
insurance on a worker-by-worker basis and are charged a separate premium for each worker. 
Jobs that offer health insurance feature a negative compensating wage differential.  Moreover,
each individual job (worker-firm match) can have its own compensation structure; firms can
offer insurance to some workers and not others, and can pay lower wages to those workers whose
insurance costs more.
We assume that individuals have preferences over wage compensation and health
insurance:
(1) Uij = U(Wij, Hij)
where Wij is the wage level of worker i at firm j, and Hij is a binary indicator for insurance
coverage of worker i at firm j (Hij = 1 or 0).  The (pre-compensating differential) wage rate for
each worker/job match is equal to the worker's marginal product at that job.
Given these preferences, individuals will desire health insurance coverage if there is a
compensating wage differential )Wij such that:
(2) U(Wij - )Wij, 1) - U(Wij, 0) = Vij > 0
Suppose that there are a continuum of jobs in the economy, and that the labor market is
perfectly competitive.  Firms face identical worker-specific insurance price schedules; a given
worker i incurs a cost of insurance Cij = Ci in whatever firm he works.  In this world, firms will
provide insurance to their workers if:
(3) )Wij > Ci
As a result of perfect competition, firms will bid the compensating differential down to
the level Ci.  Thus, all workers covered by insurance will earn exactly:
(4) Wij - )Wij  = Wij - Ci
on whatever job they hold.  
In this simplified model, there is no real effect of health insurance on the labor market
equilibrium.  The introduction of health insurance simply leads to lower wages for workers who
value that insurance at its cost or more.  If individuals wish to change jobs, they can simply ask
their new employer to provide them with insurance and lower their wage by Ci.  Workers for
whom Vij > 0 are earning rents from the fact that they value insurance at above its cost, but firms
cannot extract those rents, since workers will be bid away by other employers who charge them
the appropriate compensating differential.  Most importantly, there is no inefficiency from health
insurance: since workers will pay the same compensating differential Ci wherever they work,
they will choose the job with the highest level of wages Wij.  So workers will find the best job-
specific matches, regardless of their tastes for insurance.5
This highly stylized model is useful for illustrating the conditions necessary to generate
no mobility effects of insurance.  But reality departs from this model in at least two important
ways.  First, employers are constrained in their ability to freely set employee-specific
compensation packages, offering insurance to some workers and not to others.  The Internal
Revenue Code gives favorable tax treatment to employer expenditures on health insurance only if
most workers are offered an equivalent benefits package.  Moreover, the costs of administering
such a complicated benefits system would absorb much of the rents that workers would earn
from its existence.  And the problems of preference revelation in this context are daunting; it is
difficult in reality to see how firms could appropriately set worker-specific compensating
differentials.  This departure implies that there will be match-specific rents for workers attached
to particular jobs.
Second, employers differ dramatically in the underlying costs of providing health
insurance.  For example, the cost of insurance is much higher in small firms.  There are
enormous economies of scale in insurance purchase resulting from fixed costs in administration
that must be paid for any size group.  Large workplace pools also provide a means for individuals
to purchase insurance without the adverse selection premium that insurers demand in the
individual health insurance marketplace, since the unobservable components of health will
average out in large groups.  For smaller groups, on the other hand, there is the risk that
insurance purchase is driven by the needs of one or two (unobservably) very ill employees,
whose costs cannot possibly be covered by the premium payments of healthier workers.  As the
Congressional Research Service (1988) reports, the loading factor on insurance purchases by the
very smallest groups (firms with less than 5 employees) is over 40% higher than that on very
large groups (more than 10,000 employees), and the loading factor for individual insurance is
even higher.  Moreover, Cutler (1994) finds more dispersion in per worker health insurance
premiums among small firms than among larger ones, which is consistent with greater adverse
selection problems in the small group market.
More generally, Cutler (1994) documents that, even conditional on observable factors
such as firm size and benefits package characteristics, there remains huge variation in insurance
premiums across otherwise identical firms. This variation arises from both unobserved
differences in the relationship between firm characteristics and insurance supply prices, and from
heterogeneity in the workforce along health dimensions.  This implies that workers may be
unable to obtain health insurance on comparable terms across jobs.
As a result of these two features, there will be matching of particular workers and firms in
labor market equilibrium: those workers who most desire health insurance coverage will work at
firms offering insurance, and those firms who can provide that insurance most cheaply will offer
it.  In the extreme case of a perfectly competitive labor market, there will be a market-wide
compensating differential )W.  Workers will only work at firms offering insurance if their
valuation of insurance is at least as great as this compensating differential, Vij > )W.  Firms will
only offer insurance if the per worker cost of insurance to that firm, Cj, is less than the
compensating differential, Cj < )W.  This is the compensating differentials equilibrium
described by Rosen (1986).  As highlighted by his discussion, in equilibrium all of the workers6
whose valuation of insurance Vij is greater than )W will be earning rents from working at a job
with health insurance; similarly, all firms whose costs of insurance Cj are below )W will earn
rents.
Adding these complications introduces the possibility of job lock.  Suppose that an
individual now holds job 0, but would be more productive on job 1 (Wi1 > Wi0).  The cost of
insurance to firm 1 is much higher, however (C1 > C0).  This high cost might arise from a high
loading factor, or from the fact that the firm has a relatively unhealthy workforce and is
experience rated.  As a result, firm 1 does not offer insurance; even though this insurance would
attract worker i, it will cost too much to provide for the rest of the workforce.  And, most
importantly, the insurance can't just be provided for worker i.  As a result, if:
(5) U(Wi0 - )W, 1) - U(Wi1, 0) > 0
then the worker will not switch jobs, even though he would be more productive on the new job. 
This is the welfare loss from job lock: productivity improving switches are not made.
Note that, in theory, firm 0 could extract the surplus from this worker, knowing that he
will not move to firm 1.  Full extraction of these rents would mean that there was no net
"locking" of the employee into his job at firm 0.  The key question, of course, is the extent to
which firms can discriminate in wages on the basis of the value of insurance.  
There is a long literature on the incidence of health insurance costs which speaks to this
question, and it is reviewed by others at this conference, as well as in Gruber (2000).  That
literature finds clear evidence that the costs of insurance are shifted to worker wages on average,
at least in the medium to long run.  And there is also evidence in Gruber (1994) and Sheiner
(1999) cost shifting to broad demographic groups within the workplace, with relatively high cost
groups (such as older workers or women of child-bearing age) receiving lower wages as a result. 
But there is no evidence to date that speaks to worker-specific shifting.  In practice, full rent
capture on a worker-by-worker basis seems unlikely, due to preference revelation and
administrative difficulties.  So long as pay discrimination by valuation of insurance doesn't occur
on a person-by-person basis, there will be job lock.
It is important to note that this type of lock arises from any employee benefit for which
there is differential valuation across workers, differential costs of provision across employers,
and the inability to set worker-specific compensation packages (e.g. workplace safety, or the
location of the firm).  The key insight is that in these situations, a firm cannot offer the benefit
just to the marginal worker whom it wishes to attract, leading to job-specific rents and job-lock. 
In practice, however, this effect is likely to be quite large for health insurance relative to other
benefits, since both the variation in valuation across workers and the variation in costs of
provision across firms are much higher than for other workplace amenities.  
In theory, this problem only arises for workers considering switches from the sector
providing insurance to the sector not providing insurance.  But, even within the insurance7
providing sector, there may be job lock arising from the fact that health insurance coverage is not
a homogenous good.  For example, pre-existing conditions exclusions may leave the worker
exposed to large medical costs if he switches to a new plan.  There are also probationary periods
for new coverage and (in the extreme) medical underwriting and the exclusion of costly new
employees from insurance coverage.  Job changers may also lose credit towards deductibles and
out-of-pocket payment limits under their old plans, raising the out of pocket costs of medical care
on a new job relative to an old one.  In addition, health insurance is not a discrete choice but
rather a continuum of policy features.  The worker's current job may offer a wider range of
insurance options that is  not available at other jobs which offer insurance, making job switching
unattractive, particularly if the worker is restricted (through a managed care plan) from using his
preferred medical providers.  Finally, the fact that insurance purchased in the individual market is
very expensive, less comprehensive, and potentially not even available to very unhealthy
applicants, also raises the costs of off-the-job search.  All of these factors mitigate against leaving
a job that currently has insurance even if the next job is likely to have insurance as well.
Although we have framed the preceding discussion around the specific issue of job
mobility, the same model developed above can be applied to labor supply decisions as well.  In
this case, the choice for the worker is not between one job and another, but between employment
and nonemployment, where the health insurance availability across these two states may possibly
differ.  For example, consider an older worker thinking about whether to retire.  Even if his value
of leisure is greater than his marginal product of labor, a less healthy older worker may be
unwilling to retire from a job that offers health insurance if health insurance when not employed
is either not available or prohibitively expensive.  This is a form of “lock.”  
Retirement is not the only labor supply decision that might be impacted by health
insurance.  Another example is the decision to enter the labor market and leave public assistance
programs which have health insurance benefits attached to them.  As discussed below, most of
those who leave welfare programs move to jobs where health insurance is not available.  As a
result, the decision to move from welfare to work is akin to the decision to move from a job with
insurance to one without.  As such, “welfare lock” may be another important consequence of the
desire to maintain health insurance coverage.
Another important labor supply decision that can be impacted by health insurance is the
decision of secondary workers to be employed.  In many cases, secondary earners in a family may
be the source of health insurance coverage for the family, particularly if the primary earner is
self-employed or in a very small firm.  As these secondary earners think about leaving their job,
perhaps to attend to family matters, they face the same decision as someone switching from a job
with health insurance to another one without it, its just that here the alternative is not working at
all.  But if the family would be happier, health insurance aside, with the secondary worker not
working, then there is once again a form of “lock” within the framework developed by the model
above.
In the next three sections, we will review what the empirical literature has taught us about
the impact of health insurance on labor supply and job mobility.  We begin with the outcome that     
2See, for example, Diamond and Hausman (1984); Bazzoli (1985); Bound (1989); and Stern (1989).  See also the
recent review in Currie and Madrian (1999).
     
3Unless, of course, employers are able to shift the higher costs of experience rated insurance of older workers to
their wages.  Sheiner (1999) suggests that this is in fact the case.  Even if there is shifting of employer costs to older
workers, however, this group may still value employer-provided insurance particularly highly for two reasons.  First,
the variance of medical expenditures grows with age, increasing the value of having insurance.  Second, the
differential cost of individual and group policies also grows with age, so that even if older workers are essentially
paying for their health insurance through lower wages, they would rather have group coverage than face the
individual insurance market.
     
4This table summarizes Tables 1-4 in Gruber and Madrian (1996).  The medical expenditure statistics in the
column labeled “65+” are restricted to those aged 65-74, corresponding to Table 4 in Gruber and Madrian.
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appears to have been most impacted by health insurance, namely the retirement of older workers. 
We then turn to two other groups whose labor supply may also be influenced by health
insurance–low income single mothers, and married women and other prime-aged workers.  We
next address the question of whether health insurance impacts job mobility.  We conclude with a
discussion of the welfare considerations of these results.
III.  Health Insurance and Retirement
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that health insurance should be an important
determinant of retirement.  In a Gallup poll, 63% of working Americans reported that they
"would delay retirement until becoming eligible for Medicare [age 65] if their employers were
not going to provide health coverage" despite the fact that 50% "said they would prefer to retire
early–by age 62" (Employee Benefit Research Institute, 1990).  Despite these persuasive
arguments, and despite the existence of an enormous literature on the effects of health status on
retirement decisions,
2 it is only over the past decade that researchers have focused on the effect of
the availability of health insurance coverage on the retirement decision.  
As highlighted above, the existence of rents attached to jobs with health insurance implies
that workers will be reluctant to move from these jobs to non-employment.  We might expect this
effect to be strongest for older workers since this group is likely to earn the largest rents from
within-workplace pooling of insurance purchase.
3  This is because of the high and variable
medical cost exposure for older individuals, as documented in Table 1, which shows a variety of
indicators of health status by age.
4   
There is a clear deterioration in health and an increase in medical utilization/spending
after age 55.  Compared to those age 35-44, for example, those age 55-64 are: twice as likely to
report themselves in fair health and four times as likely to report themselves in poor health; four
times as likely to have had a stroke or have cancer, seven times as likely to have had a heart
attack, and five times as likely to have heart disease; twice as likely to be admitted to a hospital
(with twice as many nights in the hospital if admitted); and 40% more likely to have a prescribed    
5Presumably retirees have already paid for the full cost of post-retirement health insurance through lower wages
during their employment years.  To our knowledge, the magnitude of this particular wage-health insurance tradeoff
has not been empirically estimated.
    
6In fact, Medicare is much less generous than the typical employer-provided health insurance policy.  As a result,
the majority of Medicare recipients have some type of supplemental (“Medigap”) insurance, either through their
former employers or purchased in the private market.  The private market for this type of insurance is extensively
regulated and is not in general plagued by the adverse selection problems typical of the private market for basic non-
group coverage.
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medicine (with twice as many medicines if receiving a prescription).  As a result, the medical
spending of 55-64 year-olds is almost twice as large, and twice as variable, as that of 35-44 year-
olds.
These older workers with depreciating health face an interesting dilemma.  On the one
hand, their declining health makes retirement more attractive.  On the other hand, being in poor
health raises the value of employer-provided health insurance, increasing the cost of labor force
departure.  As already noted, if health insurance loss is costly, the desire to maintain continued
health insurance coverage will motivate continued employment over retirement.
Not all individuals, however, lose their health insurance upon retirement.  Some
employers continue to provide health insurance coverage to their employees following retirement
while others do not.  Most post-retirement health insurance for early retirees provides equivalent
(or near-equivalent) coverage to that of active workers at a similar cost.
5  For these individuals,
health insurance will not be a factor in determining when to retire.  Rather, the retirement
decision will be determined solely by individual preferences and the financial incentives
associated with pensions, social security, and other personal assets.
Eventually, all older individuals will become eligible for Medicare.  For those with
employer-provided post-retirement health insurance, Medicare should have little impact on
retirement.  But for those with employer-provided health insurance but without retiree health
insurance, Medicare reduces the cost of retirement by replacing the health insurance lost through
retirement.
6  Thus, these individual face an incentive to postpone retirement until they are eligible
for Medicare at age 65.
With this background, what then is the empirical evidence on whether health insurance
affects retirement?  Table 2 surveys the 16 papers written on this topic.  Despite using a variety
of estimation techniques and several different types of datasets, almost every examination of the
topic has found an economically and statistically significant impact of health insurance on
retirement (see the first column of Table 6).  We discuss the few notable exceptions in more
detail below.
There have been two parallel strands of research on how health insurance affect
retirement, one taking a structural approach to modeling retirement behavior, and the other     
7Blau and Gilleskie (2001a) also find that the magnitudes of the effects of both employer-provided health
insurance for active employees and employer-provided health insurance for retirees increase with age.  
     
8We should also note that because of this correlation between pension early-retirement incentives and retiree
health insurance availability, the estimated retirement effects of pensions on retirement in the extensive pension
literature are also likely to be overstated.
     
9Madrian (1994a) suggests that the extent of the bias generated by selection issues is likely mitigated by the fact
that a substantial fraction of younger employees have no idea whether or not their employers offer retiree health
insurance.  Thus, the availability of retiree health insurance does not appear to be a factor in the employment
decisions of many individuals when they accept a job, although it may become a factor in their retirement decisions
ex post.
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looking at reduced form relationships.  In both strands of literature, the earliest studies focused
on estimating the effect of retiree health insurance on retirement.  Subsequent studies have
branched out to consider other types of health insurance, such as Medicare, as well.
Several papers have estimated reduced form models of the impact of employer-provided
post retirement health insurance on retirement.  These papers suggest that retiree health insurance
increases the retirement hazard by 30%-80% (Gruber and Madrian, 1995; Karoly and Rogowski,
1994; Blau and Gilleskie, 2001a) and reduces the age at retirement by 6 to 24 months (Madrian
1994a; Blau and Gilleskie, 2001a).
7   In a similar vein, Johnson, Davidoff and Perese (1999)
calculate the net present value of the health insurance costs that would be borne if an individual
were to retire at a given age, and finds that the higher are these costs, the less likely an individual
is to retire.
These reduced form studies that have examined the impact of retiree health insurance on
retirement (Madrian, 1994; Karoly and Rogowski, 1994; Headen, Clark and Ghent, 1997; Hurd
and McGarry, 1996; Rogowki and Karoly, 2000) all suffer from a similar set of problems–a
potential endogeneity between either retiree health insurance availability and the pension
incentives associated with retirement, or a correlation between retiree health insurance
availability and individual preferences for leisure.  Many companies have pension plans that
encourage retirement at ages before individuals are eligible for Medicare.  These companies,
however, are also more likely to offer retiree health insurance benefits.  Thus, the pension-related
incentives for early retirement are correlated with the health insurance incentives for early
retirement.  None of these reduced form studies, however, account for the pension-related
retirement incentives in any satisfactory manner.  If pension-related early retirement incentives
are positively correlated with retiree health insurance provision, it is likely that the reduced form
estimates of the effect of retiree health insurance on retirement are too large.
8  Similarly, the
selection of individuals with strong preferences for leisure into jobs that offer retiree health
insurance will also lead to an upward bias in the reduced form estimates of the effect of retiree
health insurance on retirement.
9
There have been two approaches to dealing with these simultaneity issues.  The first is to
find variation in insurance availability after retirement that is exogenous to retirement tastes.      
10Continuation of coverage laws mandate that employers must allow employees and their dependents the option to
continue purchasing health insurance through the employer’s health plan for a specified period of time after coverage
would otherwise terminate (the reasons that health insurance might terminate include things such as a job change, a
reduction in hours, or an event which would cause a dependent to lose coverage such as a divorce).  Minnesota, in
1974, was the first state to pass a continuation of coverage law.  Several states passed similar laws over the next
decade.  The federal government mandated this coverage at the national level in 1986 with a law now commonly
referred to as COBRA.  See Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) for more detail on continuation of coverage laws.
11
Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) follow this approach by studying the impact of state and
federal “continuation of coverage” laws (e.g. COBRA) which allow individuals to maintain their
health insurance from a previous employer for a period of up to 18 months.
10  This coverage
comes at some cost to the former employee, both directly in terms of premium costs, and
indirectly as COBRA premiums do not receive the same favorable tax treatment employer-
provided health insurance expenditures.  COBRA recipients do, however, benefit from the other
price-reducing benefits of employer-provided health insurance.  COBRA also allows individuals
to maintain continuous coverage, a feature that may be important in families who might be
denied coverage because of the preexisting conditions exclusions that are part of almost all
private market policies and many employer-provided policies as well.  The value of identifying
the effect of health insurance on retirement from this type of health insurance coverage is that in
contrast to post-retirement health insurance, it is completely independent of omitted personal
characteristics that may be correlated with both post-retirement health insurance and the
incentives to retire, and it is completely independent of omitted job characteristics, such as
pension plan provisions, that may be correlated with both employer-provided and retiree health
insurance.  Thus, it provides a relatively clean source of variation for identifying the effect of
health insurance on retirement. 
Gruber and Madrian (1995) find that continuation coverage increases the retirement
hazard by 30%.  While this is at the lower end of the estimated magnitudes for the impact of
retiree health insurance coverage on retirement, this is a very large effect given that COBRA
provides only 18 months of coverage for which individuals must pay the full average group cost. 
Thus, these findings use a relatively exogenous source of variation to confirm that retirement is
very sensitive to health insurance availability.
Berger, et al. (2000) also examine the impact of COBRA on the joint
employment/retirement decisions of husbands and wives in married couple families.  In contrast
to Gruber and Madrian, however, they identify the impact of COBRA from variation in firm size:
firms employing fewer than 25 individuals are exempt from the federal law requiring
continuation coverage.  They find little impact of COBRA on retirement using this approach, but
their approach is not a particularly compelling one.  First, firm size is likely to be correlated with
other factors that influence retirement such as the availability and/or generosity of pension
coverage, and the direction of the effect of these omitted variables on retirement behavior is not
unambiguous.  Second, the impact of COBRA in their empirical specification is identified from
an interaction between health insurance coverage and firm size in a sample that is relatively small     
11Note that employee benefit data from the BLS suggests that retiree health insurance eligibility is only contingent
on pension eligibility for 25% of those working in firms that provide retiree health insurance.
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to begin with, so the statistical precision of the resulting estimates are likely to be low no matter
what the true effect is.
The second approach to dealing with the potential endogeneity between health insurance
availability after retirement and other incentives to retire is to develop a richer structural model
of retirement decisions.  Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) were the first paper to follow this
approach.  They use RHS data to estimate a structural model that incoporates both pension and
health insurance related incentives to retire.  They estimate that retiree health insurance reduces
the age at retirement by a mere 1.3 months and decreases the labor force participation rate at age
62 by only 1 percentage point.  However, they also find that retiree health insurance increases the
retirement hazard at age 62 by 6 percentage points (47%).  These seemingly disparate results
arise because the nature of the structural model estimated by Gustman and Steinmeier relies on
an assumption about the rate at which retiree health insurance benefits accrue (analogous to a
pension accrual rate).  Their paper assumes that eligibility for retiree health insurance coincides
with the eligibility for pension early retirement benefits.
11  These assumptions about retiree health
insurance eligibility imply that as with pensions, individuals who have not yet “vested” in their
retiree health insurance benefits will delay retirement until they are eligible for these benefits, but
once eligible, there will be a large increase in the retirement hazard.  A model making different
assumptions about the eligibilty for retiree health insurance could yield very different estimates. 
Note, however, that even within the context of the assumptions made by Gustman and Steinmeier
(1994), retiree health insurance has a strong influence on the timing on retirement even if its
estimated effects on overall labor force participation are not large.
A more recent, and highly sophisticated structural dynamic programming model of
retirement using RHS data is estimated by Rust and Phelan (1997).  This complicated model is
computationally demanding, but potentially can provide a richer framework for capturing the
dynamics of the retirement decision.  Even after accounting for the social security incentives
associated with retirement, Rust and Phelan estimate sizeable affects of health insurance on
retirement.  For example, they find that retiree health insurance decreases the probability of
working full-time by 10 percentage points (12%) at ages 58-59, by 20 percentage points at ages
60-61 (29%), and by 16 percentage points (25%) at ages 62-63.  The major obstacle to
generalizing from the results of this study is that the sample was restricted to men without a
pension, a somewhat non-representative sample.  While it is difficult to compare these estimates
of the effects of retiree health insurance on labor force participation with the effects on the
retirement hazard estimated in most of the reduced form papers, both sets of results suggest a
rather large effect of health insurance on retirement.
Two recent working papers using structural models and more-recent HRS data estimate
smaller effects of retiree health insurance on retirement behavior.  The first, by Blau and
Gilleskie (2001b), uses the first two waves of the HRS to estimate a joint model of retirement for13
husbands and wives.  They find little impact of health insurance on individual or joint retirement
behavior when the effect of health insurance is forced to operate solely through the budget
constraint in the model.  When they allow the utility function to be directly impacted by health
insurance availability, they find that retiree health insurance availability does lead to earlier
retirement, although they hesitate to place an economic interpretation on these results.  The
authors do not speculate about what could drive the discrepancy between the results of the purely
structural model versus allowing for utility directly from having health insurance: does the
availability of retiree health insurance proxy for some other factor, perhaps a preference
parameter, for early retirement?  Or do individuals value health insurance coverage too highly? 
Or does the model miss some important costs potentially associated with being uninsured?  
While these results suggest that health insurance may not be as important a factor in retirement
decisions as previous research has suggested, there are some important caveats in the
interpretation of these results.  First, because of data issues, the sample used in the estimation has
a much lower rate of health insurance coverage than a representative sample of HRS respondents. 
To the extent this skews the sample toward being comprised of people whose actions are less
likely to be responsive to the availability of health insurance, the simulated effects of health
insurance on retirement may be understated.  Second, the age of the sample, those 51-63 in the
first wave of the HRS, is relatively young for a study in which retirement decisions are only
actually observed over the next two years.  To the extent that Medicare eligibility motivates
retirement at age 65, its effects are not actually observed in the data even though the value of
Medicare is modeled in the estimation.
The second paper estimating a structural model of retirement using HRS data is by French
and Jones (2001).  They also suggests that health insurance has little impact on retirement
behavior.  French and Jones posit that individuals with high levels of wealth should be less
sensitive to the availability of health insurance in their retirement decisions because they can
afford to self-insure.  They find little difference, however, in the retirement hazards of
individuals with retiree health insurance depending on the level of assets held by these
individuals.  Their study, however, does not adequately account for other underlying differences
across individuals that affect both asset levels and retirement.  For example, individuals in
professional occupations (doctors, lawyers), have high levels of assets, jobs that are likely to
allow for gradual transitions from full-time work to retirement, and jobs that are less likely to be
impacted by health declines that accompany aging.  Thus, the nature of the jobs held by high
asset individuals implies that they are likely to have very different retirement hazards than
individuals with low levels of assets, even if their valuation of retiree health insurance is the
same.  Overall, the approach taken to identifying the affect of health insurance on retirement in
this paper does not seem well-grounded.
Evidence on the relationship between Medicare eligibility and retirement is much more
limited.  Identification of the effect of Medicare is complicated by the fact that Medicare
eligibility coincides with the social security normal retirement age.  In their structural dynamic
programming model, Rust and Phelan (1997) identify the effect of Medicare from the expected
distribution of medical care expenditures and a risk aversion parameter included in the dynamic
program.  They find that men with employer-provided health insurance but without employer-    
12Wives are, on average, three years younger than their husbands (Madrian and Beaulieu, 1998).
    
13Data limitations include the lack of information on pension plan availability (Gruber and Madrian, 1995 and
1996; Madrian, 1994a; Karoly and Rogowski, 1994) or lack of information on specific pension plan incentives
(Rogowski and Karoly, 2000; Blau and Gilleskie, 2001a; French and Jones 2001); the lack or quality of measures of
employer-provided or retiree health insurance (Madrian, 1994a; Karoly and Rogowski, 1994; Rust and Phelan, 1997;
Gustman and Steinmeier, 1994); the restrictiveness of the sample (Rust and Phelan, 1997; Lumsdaine, Stock and
Wise, 1994); and the age of the data (Rust and Phelan, 1997 and Gustman and Steinmeier, 1994).
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provided retiree health insurance are indeed less likely to leave the labor force before age 65 than
men whose health insurance continues into retirement.  Somewhat paradoxically they find that
even after age 65, men with employer-provided health insurance but without employer-provided
retiree health insurance have a lower retirement hazard.  They suggest that this may be due to the
fact that Medicare coverage is much less generous than the “cadillac” health insurance coverage
provided by employers.  One reason for this, posited by Madrian and Beaulieu (1998), is that
employer-provided health insurance typically covers dependents while Medicare does not.
Consequently, a labor force departure for an individual with employer-provided health insurance
but not post-retirement health insurance will result in a loss of health insurance coverage for both
one’s self and one’s spouse.  The lack of Medicare dependent coverage creates an incentive for
men with employer-provided health insurance who are themselves Medicare eligible to continue
working until their wives reach age 65 and are Medicare eligible as well.
12  Madrian and
Beaulieau show that at all ages, the retirement hazard for 55-69 year-old married men increases
substantially when their wives reach age 65 and are eligible for Medicare, suggestive evidence of
yet another link between health insurance and retirement.  The results of Madrian and Beaulieu,
however, are suggestive at best as the data used in their analysis–1980 and 1990 Census
data–contains no information on either pensions or health insurance.
In contrast to Rust and Phelan (1997) and Madrian and Beaulieu (1998), Lumsdaine,
Stock and Wise (1994) find little effect of Medicare on retirement decisions.  In their paper, they
incorporate the value of Medicare into a structural retirement model estimated using the
personnel records from a large U.S. firm.  The company analyzed, however, provided retiree
health insurance to its employees, and thus for these employees there was little additional value
associated with Medicare.  In this context, the lack on an effect is unsurprising, and one would
certainly be hesitant to generalize from these conclusions.
Despite the overall consensus of the evidence that there is an effect of health insurance on
retirement, there is still quite a lot of research to be done in quantifying the magnitude of this
effect.  This is due in large part to data constraints that limit the reliability or the generality of the
results in the current literature.
13  The next step to be taken in this literature is to estimate the
effects of health insurance on retirement while more fully accounting for the age-specific
retirement incentives associated with both Social Security and pensions using current data.  For
several years now, researchers have been pinning their hopes on the HRS for providing the
“ultimate answer” to the question of how health insurance affects retirement because it contains
information with which to do this.  With now almost a decade having passed since the first     
14French and Jones (2001) use data from Waves I through IV.
     
15See Ruhm (1990) and Peracchi and Welch (1994) for a more complete discussion of “bridge jobs” to retirement.
     
16Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1994), Headen, Clark and Ghent (1997), Hurd and McGarry (1996), Blau and
Gilleskie (2001b), Johnson, Davidoff and Perese (1999) and Berger et al. (2000) are the notable exceptions.
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fielding of the HRS, the literature has been slow to progress on this front.  While several papers
have examined the effect of health insurance on retirement in the HRS, only one to date has used
data beyond Wave II.
14  But incorporating the later waves is clearly critical, as none of the age-
eligible HRS respondents have reached 65 in Wave II.  Our hopes for the “ultimate answer” from
the HRS are somewhat tempered by issues of sample size. After restricting their sample to age-
eligible couples with valid data from both the Social Security and HIPPS supplements, Blau and
Gilleskie (2001b) are left with a sample of less than 700 couples. This strikes us as a rather small
sample to work with, and one likely to result in imprecise estimates for many variables of
interest.  Adding in single individuals and/or non-age-eligible individuals would increase the
sample size, but depending on the context, one may or may not wish to do this. 
Beyond the issue of estimating an integrated economic analysis of the effects of Social
security, pensions, health insurance, and health on retirement, several other refinements of the
literature are also warranted.  Recent research on retirement has recognized that for many
individuals, retirement is not the “absorbing state” that simplified theories portray it to be.  A
nontrivial fraction of workers move from full-time employment to part-time employment and
then to complete retirement.
15  Many other older workers make several transitions in and out of
the labor force before making the final “absorbing” switch to retirement.  And a sizeable fraction
of non-retired workers state a preference for a gradual transition from work to retirement (Hurd
and McGarry, 1996).  Health insurance, however, may be an important factor limiting the ability
of workers to “retire” as they wish.  Because health insurance is usually attached to full-time
rather than to part-time work, it may be difficult for workers to gradually transition to part-time
work if doing so involves relinquishing health insurance.  Rust and Phelan (1997) estimate that
men with employer-provided retiree or other non-employment based health insurance are much
less likely to be working full-time than men whose employers provide health insurance but not
retiree health insurance, but they are much more likely to be working part-time.  This suggests
that health insurance may indeed be an important factor determining whether older workers are
able to make a gradual transition from work to retirement as desired.
Consistent with most of the retirement literature, the literature on health insurance and
retirement has focused almost exclusively on men.
16  This is because the labor force participation
rate of older women has historically been low, and among older women who do work, a sizeable
fraction are in fact insured by their husbands.  Consequently, it has been assumed that the
potential behavioral impact among women is small.  As the labor force participation rate of older
women increases, however, and as an increasing number of older women become the sole head
of household or the primary insurers of their families, the question of whether health insurance
impacts women differentially than men warrants further investigation.    
17This also suggests that estimates of the effect of AFDC on labor supply that do not recognize the colinearity of
AFDC and Medicaid may overstate the effects of AFDC.
     
18See Currie and Madrian (1999) for a survey of the extensive literature on health and labor supply.
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IV.  Health Insurance and the Labor Supply of Lower Income Single Mothers
Another margin along which health insurance might affect labor market outcomes is
through the labor supply decisions of potential public assistance recipients.  Table 3 describes the
16 papers that we survey on this topic, and the results of these surveys are summarized in the
second column of Table 6.  A key feature of both the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF, formerly Aid to Families with Dependent Children or AFDC) and the Supplemental
Security Insurance (SSI) programs is that, in addition to cash and other benefits, recipients
qualify for Medicaid.  Because the groups who qualify for these types of programs–low income
single female-headed families and the low income disabled and elderly–tend to qualify for low-
wage, low-skilled jobs without health insurance, the coupling of Medicaid with public assistance
encourages individuals to sign up for and to remain enrolled in public assistance programs.   The
budget set for these individuals is shown by budget constraint MABC in Figure 1.  The non-
linearity in the budget set generated by the loss of Medicaid (segment AB) creates an incentive to
reduce labor supply from H to H’.
Because Medicaid participation has historically been colinear with public assistance
participation, the “Medicaid effect” on labor supply has been difficult to distinguish from the
“Welfare effect.”
17  Four identification strategies have been pursued.  The first exploits variation
in the demand for health insurance coverage generated by differences in expected medical
expenditures.  Ellwood and Adams (1990) follow this approach using administrative Medicaid
claims data, while Moffit and Wolfe (1992) do so with the SIPP.  Both papers find that the
probability of exiting public assistance decreases substantially as the imputed value of Medicaid
rises.  Moffitt and Wolfe also show that  the value of maintaining Medicaid coverage has a
significant negative impact on the labor force participation of single mothers.
Although these results support the notion that individual labor supply decisions are made
in such a way as to maintain health insurance coverage, this identification strategy is vulnerable
because the primary determinant of differences in the valuation of Medicaid benefits–namely
differences in health status–is likely to have a strong independent effect on both labor supply and
welfare participation.
18  Both studies recognize this criticism and attempt to address it by
examining the effects of the family head’s health status separate from that of the children in the
family.  Ellwood and Adams (1990) find similar effects for expected expenditure increases
generated by either the family head’s health status or the health status of children.  In contrast,
Moffitt and Wolfe (1992) find that expected expenditure increases that are generated by the
health status of the children lead to labor supply effects that are one-third as large as those
generated by expenditure increases of the family head.  However, Wolfe and Hill (1995) show
that having a disabled child leads to a reduction in maternal labor supply, so even this approach17
to disentangling the effect of  expected medical expenditures on labor supply as separate from the
effect of health is problematic.
A second approach taken has been to use variation in the generosity of the state Medicaid
programs to identify  the value of Medicaid to potential welfare recipients.  The generosity of the
state Medicaid programs is typically specified as some measure of per capita Medicaid spending
in the state (e.g., spending per recipient, or average spending for a family of a given size).   This
general approach has been pursued by Blank (1989), Winkler (1991) and Montgomery and Navin
(2000).  Blank finds no effect of Medicaid expenditures on either AFDC participation or labor
supply.  Winkler (1991) and Montgomery and Navin (2000) both find small effects of Medicaid
expenditures on labor force participation, although the effects in Montgomery and Navin
disappear once state fixed effects are included as regressors. 
Using average state Medicaid expenditures as a proxy for the value of Medicaid to
potential recipients is problematic for two reasons.  First, this measure is likely to be a very noisy
measure of the underlying value of Medicaid to potential recipients.  This is because variation in
average expenditures is likely to reflect not only variation in the generosity of the insurance, but
also variation in the underlying health of those covered and variation in the utilization patterns of
patients and practice patterns of physicians.  This type of measurement error will result in
attenuation bias, making it less likely to find an effect of Medicaid on labor market outcomes if
such an effect exists.  Second, the variation in state Medicaid expenditures that is driven by the
underlying health of the Medicaid population is likely to be spuriously correlated with labor force
participation decisions.  Because health is a significant determinant of labor force participation,
states with relatively healthy populations are likely to have both high labor force participation
rates and low average Medicaid expenditures.  This spurious correlation between labor force
participation and average Medicaid expenditures will also bias one against finding a relationship
between the value of Medicaid and labor force outcomes.
More recent papers have attempted to exploit the fact that a series of legislative initiatives
in the late 1980s severed the link between Medicaid and welfare participation for various groups
of mothers and children.  These initiatives allowed women to maintain their Medicaid coverage
for a pre-specified period of time after leaving welfare, and extended Medicaid coverage to many
groups of low-income children indefinitely (in terms of Figure 1, these initiatives change the
budget constraint from MABC to MD).  Currie and Gruber (1996a, b) estimate that as a result of
these expansions, almost one-third of children and one-half of pregnant women are eligible for
Medicaid coverage of their medical expenses.
Yelowitz (1995) was the first to exploit these Medcaid expansions as a way to identify the
effect of Medicaid coverage on AFDC and labor force participation.  He finds evidence that these
expansions in Medicaid availability led to a small but statistically significant increase in the labor
force participation rate of single mothers.  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000b) contest these results,
however, claiming that the effects estimated by Yelowitz are a result of miscalculating the AFDC
income threshold and forcing the effect of the AFDC and Medicaid income eligibility thresholds
to have the same effect.  Once Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000b) correct the calculation of the     
19See Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000a) for additional evidence suggesting that
the Medicaid expansions had little impact on the labor supply increases of single mothers over the past 15 years.
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AFDC income threshold the allow for different coefficients on the AFDC and Medicaid income
thresholds, they find that the labor force participation effects estimated in Yelowitz (1995) are
driven entirely by AFDC and not by the Medicaid expansions.
19  In an unpublished note,
Yelowitz (1998c) claims that his findings remain relatively robust to the income calculation
thresholds.  But, regardless of whether the effects exist or not, even the largest estimates here
suggest that they are small. 
Yazici (1997) also finds little effect of the Medicaid expansions on labor force
participation, although her NLSY sample is so small that it is unlikely that she would be able to
obtain statistically significant estimates of any effect unless it were a particularly large one.  In
one of the few studies on the labor supply of single mothers using longitudinal data, Ham and
Shore-Sheppard (2000) also examine the effect of the Medicaid expansions and find that they
shorten both non-employment and welfare spells, with stronger effects for the long-term non-
employed and long-term welfare recipients.  Their effects largely go away when year effects are
included in the regressions, although year effects remove a substantial fraction of the variation in
the Medicaid expansions with which to identify the effect of Medicaid.
Decker (1993) pursues a related identification strategy by examining the effect of the
introduction of the Medicaid program in the late 1960s and early 1970s on state AFDC
participation.  Because the Medicaid program was phased in across the states over a period of
several years, this provides a credible source of identification.  Using both state-level data on
AFDC caseloads and individual (CPS) data on AFDC participation, she estimates a significant
and sizeable 21% increase in the likelihood of AFDC participation.  Her estimates on the effects
of labor force participation, however, are insignificant, and suggest that the increase in AFDC
participation is due primarily to increased take-up among those already eligible and not to
reductions in labor supply leading to increased eligibility.
A final identification strategy has been to exploit differences in the availability or
generosity of employer-provided health insurance that welfare recipients could potentially obtain
were they to become employed.  This approach is pursued by Perreira (1999) using
administrative data on Medicaid participation in California, and by Meyer and Rosenbaum
(2000b) using the CPS.  Perraira finds that a 2.5 percentage point (5%) increase in the country-
wide availability of employer-provided health insurance decreases the median Medicaid spell
length by 3-11 months (10-37%).  Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000b), on the other hand, obtain
somewhat contradictory results.  They find that higher contribution rates for employer-provided
health insurance lead to a decrease in the employment of single mothers, consistent with a story
that as employer-provided health insurance becomes more expensive, Medicaid becomes
relatively more valuable.  But they also find that an increase in the value of employer-provided
health insurance decreases the employment of single mothers.   Meyer and Rosembaum (2000b)     
20See Yelowitz (2000) for evidence on elderly SSI recipients; Yelowitz (1998a and 1998b) for evidence on
disabled SSI recipients; and Yelowitz (1996) for evidence on Food Stamp receipt.
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posit a demand-side argument for this latter affect–that when employers are more likely to offer
employer-provided health insurance, they take steps to reduce employment.
In practice, using variation in the availability of employer-provided health insurance to
identify the effect of health insurance on the labor supply of single mothers is a tricky proposition
at best.  Health insurance coverage rates vary quite significantly geographically, by income, and
by hours worked.  Given this heterogeneity, any measure of “health insurance availability” or
“health insurance value” for single mothers is likely to be quite arbitrary.  Consequently, any
variation in these measures is likely to be dominated by measurement error and the results are
quite likely to be subject to a significant degree of attenuation bias.
A series of other studies by Yelowitz have also examined the effect of Medicaid on public
assistance participation other than through the TANF or AFDC programs.  Although these
studies do not examine labor supply outcomes directly, they all  find that the coupling of
Medicaid with other types of public assitance programs increases the participation in public
assistance programs.
20
Overall, the literature suggests that health insurance availability, and Medicaid in
particular, has either no or a very small effect on the labor force participation of low income
single mothers.  This is somewhat surprising given the potential importance of health insurance
for this population and their children.  On the other hand, there is some evidence that the decision
to participate in welfare programs, conditional on labor supply decisions, is fairly responsive to
the availability of health insurance.  
But the last word has clearly not been written on this topic.  Given the remaining
controversy over whether the Medicaid expansions reduced welfare participation and increased
labor supply, there is room for more work on refining these effects.  And the significant new
expansions in public insurance eligibility for children through the CHIP, along with changes in
state welfare programs resulting from welfare reform, provide further variation that can be
exploited to assess the impact of public insurance on the labor supply and welfare participation
decisions of single mothers.
V.  Health Insurance and the Labor Supply of Married Couples
Married women, and to a lesser extent married men, are another group whose labor force
participation is likely to be impacted by the availability of health insurance coverage.  And,
although most of the interest in the effect of health insurance on labor force participation in both
policy and academic circles has been focused on older workers and welfare recipients, the
potential impact in terms of aggregate effects on total hours worked may very well be largest for     
21Schone and Vistnes (2000) attempt to address the potential endogeneity of spousal health insurance coverage by
instrumenting for its availability with characteristics of the husband’s job (e.g. firm size, industry and occupation). 
To the extent that husbands seek out jobs with health insurance, however, the job characteristics that make employers
more likely to offer health insurance are simply the mechanism through which the health insurance endogeneity
operates.  
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prime-aged workers, particularly married women who are typically estimated to have a large
labor supply elasticity.  Given the responsiveness or married women to wage changes, one might
expect a sensitivity to the availability of health insurance coverage as well.
There have been 7 papers examining the labor supply of prime-aged workers who are not
single mothers.  These are described in Table 4 with the results summarized in the third column
of Table 6.  In most of these papers, the identification of the effect of health insurance on labor
supply comes from comparing the labor force participation and hours worked of married women
whose husbands have employer-provided health insurance with the labor force participation and
hours worked of married women whose husbands do not.  This identification strategy rests on the
assumption that a husband’s employer-provided health insurance is exogenous.
21  This
assumption is clearly problematic if husbands and wives make joint labor supply and job choice
decisions.  Putting this caution aside, all four studies looking at the labor force participation of
married women using U.S. data find strong evidence that the employment and hours decisions of
married women do in fact depend on whether or not health insurance is available through a
spouse’s employment.  Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) estimate that the availability of spousal
health insurance reduces the labor force participation of married women by 6-12%; Olson (1998)
estimates a similar 7-8% reduction in labor force participation;  Schone and Vistnes (2000)
estimate a 10 percentage point reduction in labor force participation; while Wellington and
Cobb-Clark (2000) estimate a substantial 20 percentage point reduction in labor force
participation.
This research also suggests that health insurance impacts not only the decision of whether
or not to work, but also job choice decisions for women who do work.   Using a multinomial
logit to categorize employment outcomes (full-time jobs with health insurance, full-time jobs
without health insurance, part-time jobs with health insurance, part-time jobs without health
insurance, and non-employment), Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) also estimate that spousal
health insurance reduces the probability of working in a full-time job with health insurance by
8.5 to 12.8 percentage points, increases the probability of working in a full-time job without
health insurance by 4.4 to 7.8 percentage points, and increases the probability of working in a
part-time job by 2.8 to 3.3 percentage points.  Schone and Vistnes (2000) estimate a reduction in
full-time work of 14 percentage points, an increase in part-time work of 2 percentage points, and
a decrease in the likelihood of having a job with employer-provided health insurance of 15
percentage points.  Wellington and Cobb-Clark (2000) estimate an annual hours reduction of 8-
17% for married women.  Finally, using an interesting application of semi-parametric estimation
techniques, Olson estimates an average decline in weekly hours of 20% (5 hours per week) for
married women whose husbands have health insurance.  21
A problem with all of the above-described studies on health insurance and the labor
supply of married women is that the a husbands’ employer-provided health insurance coverage
could be endogenous to the labor force participation decisions of their wives.  There is at least
some evidence, however, that these results are driven by the availability of health insurance per
se, and not by its correlation with any underlying taste for market work of wives.  First,
Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) find that the effect of husbands’ health insurance on wives’
labor supply is strongest in larger families, which is consistent with the notion that it is the value
of health insurance that is driving the results and not simply tastes for market work.  Second,
Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) find that wives employed in jobs without health insurance work
longer, rather than shorter hours, if their husbands have health insurance.  In addition, Olson
(1998) shows that conditional on working at least 40 hours per week, wives have a very similar
distribution of hours regardless of whether or not their husbands have health insurance.  Finally,
both Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) and Olson (1998) find that husband’s health insurance
reduces the probability of full-time employment for their wives quite substantially, but has only
small effects on the probability of part-time employment.  These findings taken together provide
support for a causal explanation for the effect of husbands health insurance on the labor force
participation of their wives, rather than a story based on unobserved correlations with tastes for
market work.
In one of the few studies of health insurance and the labor market using non-U.S. data, 
Chou and Staiger (2001) examine the effects of health insurance on spousal labor supply in
Taiwan.  Before March, 1995 when Taiwan implemented a new National Health Insurance
program, health insurance was provided primarily through one of three government-sponsored
health plans which covered workers in different sectors of the economy.  Historically these plans 
covered only workers and not their dependents.  Thus, own employment was the only way for
most individuals to obtain health insurance.  There was one exception–coverage for spouses was
extended to government workers in 1982, and subsequently to children and parents as well.  By
exploiting this variation in the availability of dependent health insurance coverage, Chou and
Staiger (2001) are able to identify the effect of health insurance on employment.  They estimate
that the labor force participation rate of women married to government employees declined by
about 3% after they were able to obtain coverage as spousal dependents relative to the labor force
participation rate of women married to other private-sector workers.  They estimate similar
declines in labor force participation for the wives of private-sector workers following the 1995
implementation of National Health Insurance which made health insurance available to all
individuals.  Their results are largely corroborated in an analogous study by Chou and Lui (2000)
using a different dataset on labor force participation in Taiwan.
Only two studies have empirically examined the effect of health insurance on the labor
force participation decisions of prime-aged men.  The first, by Wellington and Cobb-Clark
(2000), examines the effect of spousal health insurance on the employment decisions of both
husbands and wives.  As noted earlier, they find large effects of husbands’ health insurance on
the labor force participation of married women.  They also find an effect of spousal health
insurance on the labor force participation of married men:  having a wife with health insurance
reduces husbands’ labor force participation by 4-9 percentage points and annual hours by 0-4%.22
In the only other study of health insurance and employment among prime-age men,
Gruber and Madrian (1997) exploit the continuation of coverage mandates discussed earlier in
the context of retirement to consider the impact of health insurance on the transition from
employment to non-employment and on the subsequent duration of non-employment.  They find
that mandated continuation coverage increases the likelihood of experiencing a spell of non-
employment by about 15%.  It also increases the total amount of time spent non-employed by
about 15%.  Although Gruber and Madrian (1997) note that the availability of health insurance
while without a job might be expected to increase the duration of non-employment spells, they
are unable to test this proposition because the effect of health insurance on transitions from
employment to non-employment implies the possibility of a composition effect in the group of
individuals who are non-employed.  This issue is, however, clearly one of interest, and warrants
further research.
Overall, the body of empirical literature on the effects of health insurance on the labor
supply of married women and other prime-aged workers gives strong and consistent support to
the notion that health insurance affects individual labor supply decisions.  When there is a ready
source of health insurance available not attached to one’s own employment, individuals
(particularly married women) are much less likely to be employed.  This suggests that the
institutional link between health insurance and employment may be a significant factor in the
employment decisions of individuals.  But this literature is somewhat limited by a lack of
identification strategies that are as convincing as those used in the literatures on retirement,
welfare participation, and (as discussed next) job mobility.
VI.  Health Insurance and Job Turnover
The most-studied labor market outcome in the health insurance and labor markets
literature has been that of job choice.  The 18 papers we survey on this topic are described in
Table 5, and the results from these studies are summarized in the final column of Table 6. 
Recognizing that own employer-provided health insurance is likely to be correlated with other
potentially unobserved job attributes that also affect job turnover decisions, only a handful of
studies have looked directly at the impact of own employer-provided health insurance on job
mobility.  The first (Mitchell, 1982) makes no claim of trying to “identify” the effect of health
insurance on job choice in this fashion.  Two others, (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Gilleskie
and Lutz, forthcoming) attempt to use other controls to account for the positive correlation
between health insurance and other job amenities that are also likely to reduce job turnover (the
Buchmueller and Valletta study employs both this identification strategy and that discussed
below).  The last (Dey, 2000) estimates a highly structural model of job choice.
The identification strategy pursued in almost all of the other analyses of job turnover has
been to compare the probability of job departure or turnover of otherwise observationally
equivalent employees who differ only in the value that they are likely to place on a current
employer’s health insurance policy.  Various measures of the value of health insurance have been
used.  These include:23
C Health insurance coverage from a source other than one’s current employer, most
often through a spouse or some sort of continuation coverage such as COBRA
(Cooper and Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994b; Gruber and Madrian, 1994;  Holtz-
Eakin, 1994; Penrod, 1994; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Holtz-Eakin, Penrod
and Rosen, 1996; Anderson, 1997; Kapur, 1998; Slade, 1997; Madrian and
Lefgren, 1998; Berger, Black and Scott, 2001; Gilleskie and Lutz, forthcoming;
Spaulding, 1997).
C Family size (Madrian, 1994; Kapur, 1998; Berger, Black and Scott, 2001)
C Health conditions (Cooper and Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994b; Penrod, 1994;
Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen, 1996; Anderson, 1997; Kapur, 1998; Brunetti, et
al., 2000; Stroupe, Kinney and Kniesner, 2000; Berger, Black and Scott, 2001; )
C Health status (Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Penrod, 1994; Anderson, 1997; Slade, 1997;
Brunetti, et al., 2000; Berger, Black and Scott, 2001)
From the policy standpoint of evaluating the likely effect on job turnover of having health
insurance that does not depend on one’s own employment, identification based on the availability
of non-own-employment based sources of health insurance seems most appealing, if such
alternative sources of health insurance coverage are in fact exogenous.  The criticism of using
this type of identification, of course, is that the presence of alternative, non-employment based
sources of health insurance may not be exogenous.  By far the most prevalent source of such
coverage is the employment-based health insurance available to one’s spouse, and to the extent
that couples make joint family employment and health insurance coverage decisions, the health
insurance available through one spouse could impact the employment and job choice decisions of
the other spouse.  Madrian (1994b) first used the availability of spousal health insurance as a
means to identify job-lock, and estimated that it increased turnover by 25%.  Others who have
followed the same strategy have obtained qualitatively similar results (Buchmueller and Valletta,
1996; Berger, Black and Scott, 2000).  In their study of job turnover, Buchmeuller and Valletta
(1996) try to account for the potential endogeneity of spousal health insurance and find little
impact on their estimated coefficients from doing so.  This suggests that even though spousal
health insurance may be jointly determined by husbands and wives, from the standpoint of
looking at job turnover it can perhaps be treated as being exogenous.  This conclusion is also
echoed in the papers by Buchmueller and Valletta (1999) and Olson (1998) on spousal health
insurance and the labor supply of married women discussed in Section V above.
Holtz-Eakin (1994) follows a similar strategy and fails to find a significant impact of
spousal health insurance on job turnover.  However, his results are difficult to evaluate because
of well-documented problems associated with the turnover variables in the data used in his
analysis (the PSID).  Because the PSID does not do a good job tracking job changes, how exactly
one defines a job change can result in very different job turnover rates, something that suggests
the possibility of measurement error, no matter which definition is chosen.  With classical
measurement error and a continuous dependent variable, such measurement error will simply     
22Holtz-Eakin (1994), Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen (1996), and Spaulding (1997) all use PSID data to examine
the impact of health insurance on job mobility.
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result in a loss of efficiency (bigger standard errors).  In the context of limited dependent variable
models, however, measurement error in the dependent variable can lead to biased and
inconsistent coefficient estimates.  Hausman, Scott Morton and Abrevaya (1998) show how this
occurs in a general context.  Brown and Light (1992) show that in the specific context of job
choice in the PSID, how the dependent variable is defined is critical, and varying definitions can
actually result in statistically significant estimated coefficients that are of opposite signs!  These
results lead us to question the appropriateness of the PSID as a data source with which to
investigate job turnover.
22
Measurement error in the dependent variable is also likely to be quite important in the one
study that uses the CPS.  Because the CPS does not ask questions about job change, Brunetti et
al. (2000) use industry and occupation changes as a measure of job change in the CPS.  Industry
and occupation can change, however, even without a change of employer, and the significant
variation in their measure of “job change” depending on how this variable is defined (change in
industry, change in occupation, or change in both) certainly suggests that these variables are very
likely to contain a substantial degree of measurement error.  
 
Kapur (1998) criticizes the approach used in Madrian (1994b) and Buchmueller and
Valletta (1996) not because of the potential endogeneity of spousal health insurance, but because
the identification of job-lock rests on a comparison of mobility difference across those who do
and do not have health insurance.  She claims that substantial differences in the characteristics of
individuals employed in jobs with health insurance relative to individuals employed in jobs
without health insurance invalidates making such a comparison.
It is true that there are substantial differences between individuals with and without their
own employer-provided health insurance (see Table 1 of Kapur, 1998).  In using spousal health
insurance to identify job-lock, however, Madrian (1994b) obtained extremely similar estimates
whether she used a difference-in-difference estimate based on men with and without their own
health insurance, or whether she looked only at the direct effect of spousal health insurance on
men with employer-provided health insurance.  Thus, using a difference-in-difference approach
with a heterogeneous sample or looking at a simple difference in the more homogeneous sample
advocated by Kapur (1998) gives very similar estimates.
Kapur (1998) suggests an alternative approach for identifying the effects of health
insurance on job mobility: restrict the sample to individuals with employer-provided health
insurance and examine the differential effect of health conditions or health status on those with
and without spousal health insurance.  The notion here is that lacking an alternative source of
health insurance should be a greater impediment to mobility for those with family health
conditions.  Trying to identify the effect of health insurance on job turnover using variation
across individuals in health conditions has been pursued by a number of researchers, including25
Kapur (1998), Monheit and Cooper (1993), Penrod (1994), Holtz-Eakin (1994), Holtz-Eakin,
Penrod and Rosen (1996), Brunetti et al. (2000), Stroupe, Kinney and Kniesner (2000), and
Berger, Black and Scott (2001).  The precise identification strategies pursued have varied
somewhat across these papers, but the basic approach is one of the following:
1)  Include all individuals with and without employer-provided health insurance in
the sample and identify job-lock off of an interaction between employer-provided
health insurance and some measure of health conditions;
2) Include only individuals with employer-provided health insurance in the sample
and identify job-lock off of an interaction between the availability of health
insurance through a spouse and some measure of health conditions;
3) Include all individuals with and without employer-provided health insurance in
the sample and use a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach to identify
job-lock off of a three-way interaction between own health insurance, spouse
health insurance and some measure of health conditions.
With the exception of Stroupe, Kinney and Kniesner (2000), none of the papers in this
genre have found any statistically significant effect, positive or negative, of job-lock.  Although
the approach suggested above has intuitive appeal, its actual implementation is somewhat
problematic.  First, the actual prevalence of severe health problems and/or extensive medical care
utilization in the prime-aged working population is low.  This will, in general, lead to reduced
precision in the estimates.  This general issue of power is further compounded in difference-in-
difference or difference-in-difference-in-difference identification strategies, in which the
identification rests on the interaction between health status or medical care utilization and some
measure of health insurance coverage.  The prevalence of the joint state of health problems and
spousal health insurance, or of health problems, own insurance and spousal health insurance, is
even lower.  Thus, the ex ante likelihood of being able to estimate statistically significant effects
is small.  Stroupe, Kinney and Kniesner (2000) overcome the low prevalance problem associated
with chronic illnesses by using data which vastly oversamples individuals who themselves or
whose family members have chronic illnesses.  Interestingly, as noted above, this is the only
study using this source of identification that estimates a statistically significant effect of health
insurance on job turnover.  Their results suggests that health insurance reduces voluntary job
turnover by about 40%.
Second, one would ideally like to have a measure of expected medical care utilization or
health needs, but from an econometric standpoint, such measures are generally calculated on the
basis of past experience.  With prime aged workers, however, past experience may not be a very
reliable predictor of future outcomes.  For example, in married couple families with a household
head under the age of 45, a substantial fraction of physician visits and hospital admissions are
pregnancy-related.  In these families, last year’s hospital admissions are unlikely to be very
predictive of next year’s medical needs.  Similarly, Madrian (1994b) argues that pregnancy is one
of the more prevalent health conditions among prime-aged workers that is likely to generate job-26
lock (at least in the short term), but pregnancy is unlikely to be well-predicted by health or
medical care utilization in the previous year (and, if anything, is probably likely to be negatively
related to these things).  Thus, the likelihood of extensive measurement error in many of these
variables will lead to attenuation bias.
Third, to the extent that health problems impose costs on employers, both directly in
terms of increased medical costs, and indirectly in terms of the decreased productivity of workers
dealing with their own or a family members health problems, employers may actually be more
likely to dismiss such workers, which will bias one against finding any evidence of job-lock.  
Finally, there may be endogeneity in these variables that depends on the nature of the
health insurance coverage that individuals have.  For example, an individual with only own-
employer-provided health insurance who plans on changing jobs may decide to take care of
certain medical problems before changing jobs, while an individual with spousal health insurance
as well will have less incentives to do so.  Behavior of this type will bias one against finding job-
lock in the standard difference-in-difference framework employed in these studies.
None of the papers that have used various measures of health conditions or medical care
utilization to identify job-lock have addressed any of these issues.  Until it can be shown that the
criticisms levied above are likely to generate only small biases in the estimates and their standard
errors, however, it seems unlikely to us that they provide a compelling source of identification.
The one paper that uses a completely exogenous source of non-own-employment based
health insurance is Gruber and Madrian (1994), who identify the reduction in job-lock associated
with continuation of coverage mandates.  Their results imply that continuation of coverage
mandates increase turnover by about 10%.  That they estimate an increase in turnover as a result
of these mandates suggests that health insurance does in fact impede job mobility.  However,
since continuation coverage is expensive, it is unlikely that it would alleviate the full-extent of
job-lock.  The estimates of Gruber and Madrian (1994), however, could be viewed as a lower
bound on the extent of job-lock.
Cooper and Monheit (1993) use a two-stage procedure in which they first estimate the
likelihood that an individual will gain or lose health insurance coverage if he or she changes jobs,
and then identify job-lock from the inclusion of variables that measure the likelihood of gaining
or losing coverage in a job turnover regression.  They find that being likely to gain health
insurance increases turnover by 28-52%, while being likely to lose health insurance reduces
turnover by 23-39%.  Anderson (1997) finds a similar effect, namely that individuals who would
benefit most from obtaining health insurance coverage (because of pregnancy or disability), are
more likely to change jobs.  She labels this type of behavior “job-push.”
Slade (1997) takes a completely different tack in his effort to identify job-lock.  He first
documents a substantial negative correlation between health insurance coverage and the
underlying propensity of individuals to change jobs.  He notes that such a correlation implies that
looking directly at the effect of employer-provided health insurance on job mobility cannot be27
construed as evidence of job-lock because it will largely reflect unobserved heterogeneity in the
propensity to change jobs.  Much of the previous literature has recognized this potential bias,
however, and indeed, this is one rationale behind the difference-in-difference estimation strategy
first propounded by Madrian (1994b) to identify job lock.  In one of the few departures from the
difference-in-difference identification framework, Slade (1997) looks directly at the effect on job
mobility of the availability of health insurance at the state-level and at state hospital room charge
rates.  The notion behind the first measure is that if the likelihood of obtaining health insurance
in another job is high, one’s current employer-provided health insurance is less valuable.  The
latter measure is assumed to be a proxy for the former under the presumption that higher hospital
room charges will decrease the availability of health insurance.  He  finds little evidence that
these health insurance variables impact worker turnover.  
It is not clear to us that the identification strategy in Slade (1997) will really enable one to
identify the effect of health insurance on job mobility.  The measure of health insurance
availability used is the fraction of the non-elderly population in the state covered by private
health insurance.  If employers base their decision about whether or not to offer health insurance
on the underlying turnover propensities of the workforce because health insurance is more
expensive to offer when turnover is high, then states in which mobility is high for non-insurance
related reasons will have a lower rate of health insurance coverage.  This spurious correlation
between mobility and statewide private health insurance coverage will bias one against finding
an effect of health insurance availability on job mobility even if greater insurance availability
does indeed increase worker turnover.  Even in the absence of such a correlation, this measure
would not pick up job-lock that is generated by the exclusion of pre-existing conditions among
firms that do offer health insurance.
Looking at the effect of hospital room charge for evidence of job-lock is also problematic. 
Higher hospital room charges may decrease the overall availability of health insurance since the
price of health insurance is higher, and this might be expected to decrease mobility.  However,
even if the price of health insurance is higher, it is not necessarily more costly for firms to offer if
firms can recoup the increased cost through lower wages.  This would work to mitigate any
decrease in mobility that one would expect to see from higher health care costs.  Moreover, one
might expect the effect of higher hospital room charges to affect mobility differently for those
with and without health insurance.  For those with health insurance, it becomes more valuable
when health care costs are high and we would expect reduced mobility.  For those without health
insurance, obtaining health insurance becomes more desirable and we would expect increased
mobility among those without health insurance as they seek jobs to obtain this benefit.  Slade
(1997) does not separate the effect of hospital room charges for these two groups, and the
resulting coefficient is therefore likely to reflect these two effects that work in opposite
directions.
Two other papers examine the effect of health insurance on a very specific type of job
turnover, namely the transition from employment to self employment.  While the self-employed
receive some limited tax benefits for their health insurance purchases, they, in general, face a
much higher price for health insurance in addition to the potential costs associated with28
relinquishing the health insurance provided by a current employer.  The first paper on this topic,
by Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen (1996), finds no effect of health insurance on the transition
from employment to self-employment.  However, they find no affect of most other variables on
this transition either (e.g. income, race, education), so the lack of an effect for health insurance
may speak more to the quality of the data than to the actual effect of health insurance.  Madrian
and Lefgren (1998) find some evidence that both continuation coverage and spousal health
insurance increase transitions to self-employment.
The results in both of these studies, however, should be interpreted with caution.  The
issue of measurement error in the dependent variable is also likely to be of particular concern for
transitions from employment to self-employment.  Although the notional idea of “self
employment” is simple enough, the empirical identification of “the self employed” is more
nuanced because many individuals hold both wage/salary jobs and self employment jobs.  This
makes the classification of someone as a “wage/salary” worker or as a “self-employed” worker
necessarily arbitrary.  Madrian and Lefgren (1998) show that in the SIPP, the various schemes for
classifying workers as self-employed or not self-employed result in self-employment rates that
vary by a factor of 40%.  Defining transitions over time between these two states results in even
greater variation in the resulting employment-to-self-employment transition rates, which vary in
some cases by a factor of 100%.  For some very specific groups of individuals, they claim that
the transition rate between employment and self-employment is as high as 70%, something they
suggest as indicative of severe misclassification in the initial categorization of individuals as
employed vs. self-employed.  Moreover, they suggest that the estimated effects of health
insurance on self employment can be sensitive to how this specific group of individuals is
treated.  This raises a broader specter of doubt concerning the overall hope of identifying the true
effect of health insurance on employment-to-self-employment transitions as it seems clear that
any definition of such a transition will likely be subject to a significant degree of measurement
error.  The issues of measurement error in this case are further compounded by the relatively low,
on average, transition rates from employment to self-employment.  These low transition rates
make it more difficult to precisely estimate any effect, even if one exists, because the frequency
of transitions in the data is so small.
Overall, the literature on health insurance and job choice is more divided than that on
health insurance and labor force participation.  About one-third of the papers studied find that
health insurance significantly impacts the job choice decisions made by workers (Cooper and
Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994b; Gruber and Madrian, 1994; Anderson, 1997; Stroupe, Kinney
and Knieser, 2000); another one-third of the papers find no significant relationship between job
choice and health insurance  (Mitchell, 1982; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Penrod, 1994, Holtz-Eakin,
Penrod and Rosen, 1996; Slade, 1997; Kapur, 1998; Spaulding, 1997); and the remaining third
find evidence that varies by empirical specification or the sub-group analyzed, or effects that are
not statistically significant at standard levels (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Brunetti, et al.
2000; Madrian and Lefgren, 1998; Berger, Black and Scott, 2001; Gilleskie and Lutz,
forthcoming).  Given the differences in identification and data, it is interesting that a fair number
of the studies that find a significant effect of health insurance on job choice obtain estimates that
are fairly similar in magnitude–that employer-provided health insurance reduces job mobility by29
25-50% (Cooper and Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Stroupe,
Kinney and Kniesner, 2000).
In general, using spousal health insurance to identify the effect of health insurance on job
turnover results in positive and significant estimates of job-lock (Holtz-Eakin, 1994, is the
notable exception, but the data concerns discussed above may explain his results).  In contrast,
identifying job-lock from an interaction between spousal health insurance and own health, family
health, or expected medical expenditures (or a three-way interaction between these measures and
own employer-provided health insurance) tends to result in statistically insignificant coefficients
that are both positive and negative.  Thus, the conclusion of whether or not there is job-lock
seems to hinge critically on which identification strategy one finds more credible. 
Our view is that the approach of using alternative sources of insurance is more credible. 
Both approaches suffer from potential endogeneity problems, but the health/expected
expenditures approach has a host of additional difficulties that do not arise with the alternative
insurance approach.  Moreover, within this alternative insurance approach the research by Gruber
and Madrian (1994) provides an estimate which is likely free of endogeneity bias, by using
variation in state and federal continuation of coverage mandates.  So a conservative approach to
reading this literature would be to take the results of Gruber and Madrian (1994) identified from
continuation of coverage laws as providing as lower bound 10% estimate of the magnitude of
job-lock, and the results from the spousal insurance approach as providing an upper bound
estimate of 25-35%  (Madrian, 1994b; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996).
Clearly, however, the literature on health insurance and job mobility is in need of a
reconciliation between the divergent results reached by the many studies on this topic.  A study
which made a systematic comparison of the results obtaining from using different datasets,
identification strategies, and methodologies would be particularly valuable.
VII.  The Missing Piece: Welfare Implications
The review above documents the exciting approaches and important conclusions that
have emerged from a decade of high quality empirical work on health insurance and the labor
market.  Given the relative novelty of the topic and the wide variety of empirical approaches
pursued, we now have a fairly firm basis for concluding that health insurance matters for
decisions such as retirement, secondary earner labor supply, and job mobility.  This is no small
contribution.
But, with rare exceptions discussed below, this literature has largely failed along a critical
dimension: documenting, or even quite frankly discussing, the welfare implications of these
results.  Developing a full model of the welfare implications of job lock is beyond the scope of
our current effort.  But in this section we lay out the promises and pitfalls of four different
approaches that might be taken to measuring the welfare implications of health-insurance
induced immobility.  Our discussion is written with reference to job mobility. But the points and30
conclusions carry over naturally to the welfare analysis of any model of health insurance and
labor supply: the key question is the welfare consequences of a barrier to mobility from one state
to another state in which utility might be higher.
Approach A: Structural Modeling
The first potential approach is to pursue a structural model of the job mobility decision,
which begins with maximization of utility across job alternatives (or labor supply alternatives).
The advantage of this approach to empirical estimation is that it most naturally provides a
welfare framework.  This is because the estimates can be tied back to fundamental utility
parameters, allowing evaluation of utility in the different states, and thus a measure of the utility
loss from reduced mobility.
Dey (2000) estimates a structural model of job turnover in an attempt to recover estimates
of the welfare consequences of job-lock.  While he suggests that job-lock does exist (he estimates
a highly variable 2-16% reduction in mobility due to employer-provided health insurance), he
finds very small welfare effects.  It is difficult to both evaluate his results and to generalize from
them.  First, because it is not clear in the paper where the identification of job-lock comes from. 
And second, because the sample of individuals used in the estimation is individuals who were
unemployed.  If individuals who value employer-provided health insurance highly take steps to
avoid becoming unemployed, then this sample will be comprised largely of the individuals least
likely to have their labor supply decisions impacted by health insurance availability, and
consequently the welfare consequences associated with changing the nature of health insurance
availability for these individuals will be small.  For individuals who value health insurance more
highly, the welfare effects could presumably be much larger.
More generally, while estimating this type of structural model is straightforward in
theory, doing so in a credible fashion is likely to prove daunting in practice.  This is because the
data are unlikely to contain variation sufficient to pin down all the base preference parameters
required to evaluate such a utility-theoretic model.  Estimating such a model would require, at a
minimum, estimates of time discount rates, parameters of risk aversion, direct utility from
consumption of medical care relative to cash, and the disutility of labor.  As a result, any
estimates derived from this approach are likely to be heavily dependent on assumptions about the
functional form of the empirical model.
Moreover, this approach, as well as almost all of the others reviewed below, misses a
potentially key component of the welfare gain from reducing job lock: spillovers.  In increasing
returns models such as that of Kremer (1993), there can be important complementarities between
skilled workers that generate positive externalities from improved matches.  In such a world, the
gains to society from improved matches can significantly exceed the gains that would emerge
from structural models focused on the worker alone.
Approach B: Computing Productivity Loss     
23We are grateful to Sherry Glied for suggesting this point to us.
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A second approach would be to directly use data on the value of mobility to infer the cost
of this mobility restriction.  This is the approach taken by Monheit and Cooper (1994), who
perform a rough welfare calculation using their estimate of a the health insurance-induced
reduction in job mobility.  They derive the number of individuals affected by health-insurance
induced job-lock and multiply this by the average wage increase that accrues to individuals who
change jobs.  This yields a productivity loss equal to about one-third of one percent of GDP. 
But this approach raises its own difficulties.  First, the information that Monheit and
Cooper (1994) use on the average wage change for job switchers is quite crude.  Accurately
estimating the wage increase that accrues to individuals who change jobs is difficult because job
change is endogenous to the wage increase that one would be likely to obtain from doing so: 
individuals whose wages are likely to increase if they change jobs are more likely to do so, while
individuals who have found high-productivity/high-wage job matches tend to stay where they are
precisely because their wages would likely fall if they went elsewhere.  The labor literature on
job mobility and wage changes (including Monheit and Cooper, 1994) has also focused almost
exclusively on the immediate short-term changes in wages that accompany job mobility, ignoring
any effects that could potentially compound (or dissipate) over time.
Another key difficulty with this approach is that wages may be a poor proxy for marginal
productivity for workers in long term employment relationships.  The sign of the bias is not
obvious here.  On the one hand, if workers have invested in firm-specific human capital, their
wage may be below their marginal product at their current firm, but above their marginal product
on an alternative job.  On the other hand, if there are workplace norms or some other reason for
apparently inefficient long term contracts, then workers’ wages may be above their marginal
product at the current firm.  Moreover, there is once again the important issue that there may be
impacts beyond the worker themselves; if there are positive complementarities in production,
then a worker’s own wage would once again understate his or her marginal product.  Finally,
while potentially useful for thinking about job mobility, this approach is not helpful for thinking
about the welfare implications of labor supply decisions that are distorted by health insurance
because it does not speak at all to the value of leisure.
Approach C: Bounding by the Cost of Mobility
Another approach is to infer an upper bound on the cost of job lock (or other labor supply
restrictions) by noting that these costs are limited by the cost of purchasing insurance to cover the
health insurance loss induced by job change, retirement, or labor force exit.  That is, so long as
insurance is available at some price for purchase by the individual, then the welfare gain from the
passed-up job change can’t be infinitely large; at some appreciably high level, individuals would
simply purchase the insurance on their own and change jobs.  So, in principle, the cost of the
alternative form of insurance can be used to bound the costs of job lock.
23  This approach has the32
appealing feature that it is “market based” and incorporates the full utility costs of job lock,
putting a dollar bound on those costs.
In practice, this approach has important limitations as well.  The first is positing the cost
of the alternative insurance option.  For the first 18 months, this cost is well-bounded by the costs
of COBRA (at least for those workers eligible for COBRA coverage, namely those in medium
and large firms).  So, for example, this approach can clearly be used to assess the loss from
retirement lock among those more than 63.5 years old.  But for other groups, after 18 months the
cost of alternative health insurance rises to the that of purchasing a policy on the nongroup
market.  These costs are not well defined, for two reasons.  First, nongroup policies are typically
much less generous than policies provided in the group market.  Second, nongroup premiums are
much more variable, and there is no guarantee of a long-term premium.  So if an individual
becomes ill, his or her premium could rise exponentially.  In states with high risk pools or some
other insurance backstop, there is a limit to how high premiums can get, but even this limit is
subject to the political risk that the high risk pool subsidy may end.
Another issue with this approach is liquidity constraints.  Take the case of a worker
considering an alternative position that will result in higher productivity but that provides only
delayed compensation (such as stock options at a startup firm).  In this case, neither the firm nor
the worker may have much cash up front.  Even if there is a reasonably priced insurance
alternative, the firm and the employee may jointly be unable to front the funds to purchase that
insurance.
Despite these limitations, this approach lends itself to some fairly straightforward limit
calculations.  For the first 18 months, assuming full shifting of insurance costs to wages,
insurance has the same gross cost on the current job as on any new job, due to COBRA.  Of
course, since employer insurance payments are tax deductible but own insurance payments are
not, there is a net cost of moving from the current group onto COBRA coverage of one’s tax rate
times the insurance costs.  After the first 18 months, we have the difficulty of pricing nongroup
coverage, but for almost all non-elderly persons such coverage should be available at no more
than 50% higher than the current group coverage cost
This bounding approach suggests very modest costs of job lock.  For example, suppose
that current nongroup coverage for a family costs $6000 per year, of which the employee is
already paying $2000.  Suppose that a worker has a tax rate on wages of 35% (a 15% federal rate,
15% payroll tax rate, and 5% state rate). Then if he leave his current job for another job on which
he must purchase insurance, the net cost to him is the $1400 in lost tax subsidy on the health
insurance for 18 months, and at most $4400 per year (the loss in the tax subsidy plus the
differential cost of the nongroup policy) thereafter.      
24Authors’ tabulations from March 2000 Current Population Survey.
     
25Madrian (1994b) reports that 16% of her sample changed jobs over an approximately 12-month period.  A 25%
reduction in mobility using this is a baseline implies a 4 percentage point decrease in turnover.
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There are currently roughly 50 million married workers covered by health insurance on
their job.
24  Suppose that each year, job-lock accounts for a reduction in job mobility of 25%, or 4
percentage points, so that 2 million (50 million * 0.04) workers are “affected” by job lock.
25  The
maximum cost of job lock, in steady state, is therefore between $3 and $9 billion per year.  These
costs are between 0.03% and 0.09% of GDP, which is fairly small, particularly relative to the
$100 billion plus price-tag for any comprehensive reform to eliminate the problem of the
uninsured in America.
Admittedly, this is a very crude calculation.  First and foremost, it is in theory only an
upper bound.  Such an approach may be more useful for ruling out very large welfare losses than
for putting an actual cost estimate on job lock.  On the other hand, much of the welfare loss from
job lock may be due to very high cost workers for whom nongroup insurance coverage is not
available or for whom such coverage is more expensive than we assume above.  If so, this
approach would instead lead us to dramatically understate the welfare losses due to job lock. 
Moreover, the lack of long-term health insurance contracts in the nongroup market, and the
resulting variability in premiums over time, may mean that nongroup health insurance coverage
is not an attractive option even if the immediate costs are modest relative to the higher wages that
can be obtained on a new job.  Finally, this approach continues to suffer from the limitation that
it misses any spillover effects of productivity improvements, which implies that even this “upper
bound” may be understated.
Approach D: Examining Impacts of Loosening Job Lock
Another potential approach is to examine the impact on labor market outcomes of
interventions that reduce job lock.  That is, suppose that there is an exogenous change which
suddenly removes the possibility of job lock for a worker or class of workers.  Then, if there is an
important productivity impact of job lock, we should see productivity rise when this change
occurs.  Moreover, this approach holds out the only possibility for getting at the spillovers
concern which plagues all of the approaches above.  Analysis at the market level of a market
wide change which reduces job lock would allow for a calculation which incorporates any
spillover effects.
An analysis in this spirit is carried out by Gruber and Madrian (1997).  A clean example
of an intervention that reduces job lock is a continuation of coverage mandate.  Gruber and
Madrian model the reemployment earnings of job leavers as a function of whether continuation
coverage is available and examine whether such coverage improves subsequent job matches. 
They find that one year of continuation coverage availability doubles the reemployment earnings
of job leavers who take up that coverage.       
26Gruber and Madrian (1997) do try to internally test this estimate by, for example, showing that there is no effect
on the earnings of those who do not separate.
34
This is an enormous estimate which bears confirmation.
26  In particular, these effects
seem very large relative to the bounds established above.  In the data used by Gruber and
Madrian, the typical reemployment earnings are roughly $15,000 per year.  So the implication is
that providing insurance at the average group cost, even for only 18 months, allowed unemployed
workers more time to search for jobs, resulting in earnings that increased by $15,000. 
Extrapolating a gain of this magnitude to the 2 million job locked married workers in the U.S.
would cause earnings to rise by $30 billion.   But this is an upper bound because those
individuals who take continuation coverage are likely to be those who have the least access to an
attractive nongroup product.  And even this figure is not enormous relative to the size of the
economy.
On the other hand, even this large estimate does not account for any spillover effects.  As
noted above, this is the one approach that does hold out some hope for measuring spillover
effects, as one can examine aggregate impacts of changes that reduce job lock.  But such an
examination would require a very large loosening for the aggregate impact to be detectable.  
This approach is also potentially useful for looking at labor supply effects, as Gruber and
Madrian (1995) illustrate for the case of retirement.  In that paper, they find that a year of
continuation coverage raises the retirement hazard by 30%.  They then note that this effect can be
implicitly “dollarized” through comparisons to estimates of the impact of pension wealth on
retirement.  Doing so, they find that a year of continuation coverage for an older worker has the
same impact on retirement as $13,600 in pension wealth.   They also use data on the expected
distribution of medical expenses to note that this large dollar value is not inconsistent with a
relatively low coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2, given the highly variable medical costs
facing an older person retiring uninsured.
VIII. Conclusion
The past decade has witnessed the development of a large and exciting literature on
health insurance, labor supply, and job mobility.  Of the 50+ papers reviewed here, only 1 was
written before 1990.  As with any large literature, there are few conclusions on which there is
unanimous agreement.  But, relative to other areas, it appears to us that there are some fairly clear
conclusions that can be derived from this set of studies:
1)  Health Insurance is Quite Important for Retirement Decisions:  The question on
which there is probably the greatest consensus is that health insurance is a key
determinant of the decision to retire.  This is perhaps not surprising given the high and
variable level of medical costs for those near the age of Medicare eligibility.  The studies
reviewed suggest that the availability of retiree health insurance raises the odds of35
retirement by 30-80%.  This consistent conclusion emerges from very different
approaches using very different data sets.  
2) Health Insurance is Not Very Important for The Labor Supply Decisions of Low
Income Mothers: While there is some debate over whether or not there is a statistically
significant impact of health insurance availability on labor supply decisions for low
income mothers, there appears to be a fairly general consensus that such effects, if they
exist, are not large.
3) Health Insurance Appears to be Important for the Labor Supply Decisions of Married
Women:  The much smaller literature on health insurance and the labor supply of married
women is remarkably consistent in its conclusion that health insurance is important.   But
our confidence in this conclusion is tempered by the fact these small number of studies
are relatively similar, and all suffer from the fact that the identification strategy used
(assuming the exogneity of the husband’s health insurance) is contestable.
4) Alternative Health Insurance Coverage is Important for Job Mobility, Implying
Significant Job Lock:  As we have discussed at length, there is a true “schism” in the job
lock literature.  With rare exception, those studies that proxy for the value of health
insurance using a measure of alternative sources of coverage (mostly spousal insurance)
find sizeable and significant estimates of job lock.  Those studies that use health spending
as a proxy for the value of health insurance find little evidence of job lock.  Our own view
is that the former approach to studying job lock has much more to recommend it, given
the endogeneity and mismeasurement of expected medical spending.  So our view is that
there is on net strong evidence for job lock. 
5) There is Much Work to be Done on Welfare Implications:  Empirical work has run
vastly ahead of theory in this area, and no where is that more evident than in the lack of
work, and even lack of attention, to welfare issues.  We have discussed four approaches
to moving forward on the measurement of the welfare implications of job lock, but much
more work needs to be done on each of them.  To the extent that these frameworks are
useful, they suggest that the economic costs of job lock may be modest.
To summarize, we have learned a lot about the effect of health insurance on both labor
supply and job mobility over the past ten years, but relatively little about the implications of these
results.  Clearly, this is where the literature in this area needs to be heading as we embark on the
next decade of work.36
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TABLE 6.  Summary Statistics on the Health Insurance and Labor Market Outcomes Literature








Number Fraction Number Fraction Number  Fraction  Number  Fraction 
Number of studies 16 [100%] 16 [100%] 7 [100%] 18 [100%]
Published in refereed journal 7 [44%] 9 [56%] 4 [57%] 9 [50%]
Published elsewhere 3 [19%] 1 [6%] 1 [14%] 1 [6%]
Working paper/dissertation 6 [38%] 6 [38%] 2 [29%] 8 [44%]
Datasets used
a
   CPS 3 [19%] 9 [56%] 3 [43%] 1 [6%]
   SIPP 3 [19%] 3 [19%] 1 [14%] 7 [39%]
   PSID 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 3 [17%]
   Census 1 [6%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%]
   RHS 2 [13%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%]
   HRS 7 [44%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%]
   NMCUES or NMES 1 [6%] 2 [13%] 1 [14%] 3 [17%]
   NLSY 0 [0%] 1 [6%] 0 [0%] 3 [17%]
   Other 1 [6%] 3 [19%] 2 [29%] 4 [22%]
Sample
   Men only 11 [69%] 0 [0%] 1 [14%] 6 [33%]
   Women only 0 [0%] 16 [100%] 5 [71%] 0 [0%]
   Men and women 5 [31%] 0 [0%] 1 [14%] 12 [66%]
Estimation technique
   Reduced form 10 [63%] 15 [94%] 7 [100%] 17 [94%]
   Structural 6 [38%] 1 [6%] 0 [0%] 3 [17%]
Characterization of results
b
   “Positive” and significant 12 [75%] 8 [50%] 7 [100%] 6 [33%]
   Insignificant 1 [6%] 3 [19%] 0 [0%] 6 [33%]
   “Negative” and significant 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%]
   Mixed 2 [13%] 5 [31%] 0 [0%] 5 [28%]
   Unable to evaluate 1 [6%] 0 [0%] 0 [0%] 1 [6%]
a Use of multiple datasets in a study results in totals that exceed the number of studies and percentages that sum to more than
100%.
b We characterize the results of a study as “positive” (“negative”) if the results suggest that health insurance motivates
employment outcomes  in the way predicted (opposite that predicted) by our theoretical framework.TABLE A1.  Dataset and Variable Acronyms
Acronym Dataset Name or Variable Definition
Datasets
   CPS Current Population Survey
   CPS MORG CPS Merged Outgoing Rotation Group
   GSOEP German Socio-Economic Panel Survey
   HRS Health and Retirement Study
   NLSY National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
   NMCES National Medical Consumption and Expenditure Survey
   NMCUES National Medical Care Utilization and Expenditure Survey
   NMES National Medical Expenditure Survey
   PSID Panel Study on Income Dynamics
   QES Quality of Empoyment Survey
   RHS Retirement History Survey
   SIPP Survey of Income and Program Participation
Labor force variables
   FT Full-time employment
HPW Hours per week
LFP Labor Force Participation
NILF Not in the Labor Force
PT Part-time employment
Health Insurance variables
   EHI Own employer-provided health insurance
HI Health insurance
MCD Medicaid
   MCR Medicare
NI Not insured
   OHI Other non-own-employer-provided health insurance
   PHI Private Health Insurance
   QMB Qualified Medicare Beneficiary
RHI Employer-provided retiree health insurance
SHI Spouse has employer-provided health insurance
Health variables
ADL Activities of Daily Living
SRHS Self-reported health status (excellent, good, fair, poor)
WL Work limitation58
Non-Benefit
Consumption Non-Wage
Income
Leisure
H=0
Labor
H=1
U
U’
M
A
B
C
Value of
Medicaid
Medicaid
Lost
FIGURE 1
D
HH ’